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BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY: Robert G. Hogan, 74, attorney and former 
Statehood Commission member 
"Weii., I leM Waohin.gton., and I c.ame home velty fuc.oWtaged. 
. . . I Jtemembelt, I thin.k .i;t wao .Mon. a.6;telt I aJt!t..i..ved, 
~omebody -6-Jt..om the pJtu~ talked to me <tbou.t .i;t. I .6cLid 
pe.Jthap~ we ought to c.oMidelt the c.ommon.wealth .6tatU.6. Weii., 
thelte Welte ~ome people who -6-dt I wao a Ben.edic.t AJtn.old. I 
wao j U.6t telUn.g li Uke .i;t wao . I -6-Jt..an.kly -6-eU, at that 
poin.t in. time, bec.aU.6e o-6 that c.on.tJtol ~liuation. in. the 
Sen.ate, we'd n.evelt get .6tatehood. Weii., li tUJtn.ed out I wao 
WJton.g, an.d we did get .i;t in. 79 59. But I JteaUy beUeve that 
mo~t o-6 the people who Welte woJtkin.g -6-oJt li ~om 1950 up to 
maybe a yeaJt be-6-oJte li wao en.ac.ted. hon.udy -6-dt that 
we Welten.' t goin.g to get a." 
Robert G. Hogan was born in Illinois but raised in Hawai'i. He 
attended Central Grammar, Lili'uokalani, and McKinley High School. 
Following graduation, he attended Louisiana State University, earning 
a degree in engineering. 
After eventually earning a· law degree, Hogan returned to Hawai'i and 
began working for the Attorney General's office. A few years later, 
he entered private practice. He still practices law today. 
Hogan was a member of the Statehood Commission between 1949 and 1951. 
Appointed by then territorial Governor Ingram Stainback, Hogan lobbied 
Congress in 1950. He returned to Hawai'i convinced that statehood was 
then a near impossibility due to congressional opposition. 
Hogan suggested that Hawai'i seek commonwealth status as a temporary 
alternative. Statehood supporters criticized Hogan for his 
suggestion, accusing him of being against statehood. 
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ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW 
with 
Robert G. Hogan (RH) 
February 4, 1985 
Downtown Honolulu, O'ahu 
BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Warren Nishimoto (WN) 
WN: Okay, Mr. Hogan, can you tell us something about your background, 
where you were born and your education? 
RH: Well, I was born in Illinois by pure accident--Waukegan, Illinois, 
of all places. My folks happened to be there. But they were back 
in Hawai'i not too long after that. I've lived here all my life. I 
was educated in the public schools of Hawai'i. First at Central 
Grammar--well, first of all at Castle Kindergarten. And I think I 
had the envious, or not a very envious record of being one of the 
first kids that was ever kicked out of Castle Kindergarten. (Laughs) 
For what reason, I can't remember. Then I went to Central Grammar 
School which was up here on Queen Emma Street. Then from there to 
Lili'uokalani School up in Kaimuk1. And then, a year at Lincoln 
School and over to McKinley High School. Following my graduation 
from McKinley High School, I went to a--summer--to a camp in 
Interlochen, Michigan--a music camp, the National Music Camp, which 
was a great experience, an experience I commend to anybody who has 
the opportunity. 
Then I went to the sugar engineering school, the Audubon Sugar 
School at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. That was an 
interesting experience because at that point in time, the governor 
of Louisiana was Huey P. Long. And he took a great deal of interest 
in LSU, and in particular~ the band. And I had a band scholarship 
there. And [he] took the band all over--took them with him for 
political and other purposes, but primarily political purposes. 
But he genuinely liked the University. I got to know him because 
we traveled in the same trains and learned a great deal about his 
philosophy. And while I can't say that he was a great person in 
the way he did some things, he certainly was rather overly maligned, 
because he was trying to accomplish things at a time when there 
needed to be accomplishment. 
I graduated from there and came home to Hawai'i. Went into the real 
estate business, was a salesman couple of years to earn enough money 
to go back to 1 aw school • I did earn some money and I did go back 
in the January of 1937. I had the help of one of the estates here, 
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to whom I will ever be grateful, the Atherton Estate. We got out 
of law school in the summer of 1939, came home and took the bar 
examination, and paid the Atherton Estate. Then I went into the 
practice of law, passing the bar in November, 1939. Did so as a 
sole practitioner till the war started, World War II, and four days 
after that I was in the military service. I was a R.O.T.C. type so 
that I went in as a lieutenant and stayed in throughout the war to 
the end of 1945. After I gQt out, I spent a few months on the 
Mainland resting. 
When I came home, [C.] Nils Tavares, who was attorne.v-qeneral, asked me 
to join his staff at the attorney-general•s office. That was a 
very interesting experience because Nils was a fine man, one of the 
finest individuals I•ve ever known and a great credit to Hawai 1 i. 
The staff was only seven in number then for the whole attorney-
general•s office. And I was there for about a year and a half, two 
years. Went into private practice, eventually went into a partnership 
with John Dyer, who became a judge. Excellent man. Incidentally, 
it•s to his great credit, John Dyer won the first successful 
reapportionment case in the United States in 1957 or 1 56. The 
difficulty was, he did it at a time when we were a territory, but 
his efforts attracted tremendous attention nationally, and the briefs 
that he wrote were briefs sought by and sent to the various law 
firms in the country who were interested in reapportionment. And 
the famous Tennessee case that resulted in reapportionment on a state 
level used the briefs of John Dyer, which I think is greatly to his 
credit. It was a great association. 
And then I had associations with others. Peter Howell, later, and 
then, others over the years until I ventuated into a solo practice 
three years ago, and then, now, I•m in association with Peter Howell 
on an of counsel basis. The military years I had, I think, were 
gratifying and I felt I learned a lot, if you can call the war 
service gratifying. But I learned a great deal and it was worthwhile. 
CC: Somewhere back in that educational background, I recall, you came 
across a professor by the name of [J. William] Fulbright. How did 
that happen and could you describe that? 
RH: Well, that was interesting. I had met him before, and he •••• I 
was going to Washington in the winter, and I had a problem up there 
of having respiratory problems. And I was going to [University of] 
Arizona Law School for the summer and I happened to contact him. 
As a result of that, I went to [University of] Arkansas that summer. 
He was a tremendous professor. He had been a Rhodes scholar. A 
very brilliant man. Of course, I didn•t know he was going into 
politics then, which he did, after I graduated. And there were 
some other great professors there. Fulbright left an indelible 
imprint on my life because he was smart and what he stood for was 
good. His record speaks for itself. You know, the famous Fulbright 
resolution which really gave birth to the United Nations, because 
without the Congress of the United States committing itself for the 
first time to participate in a world government type of thing, 
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there never would have been the United Nations. As you know, President 
[Woodrow] Wilson was an idealist. At the end of World War I, he 
wanted the United States to become a participant in world government 
so it would minimize the probabilities of another world war. And it 
was his concept. But the United States Congress never backed him up. 
And as a result, the United States never became a member of the 
League of Nations. And perhaps we were partly at fault for World 
War II. Had we been a member of that league, perhaps that would not 
have happened. That's surmise on my part. But Fulbright put through 
that resolution as a freshman congressman in 1944. The United 
Nations was formed, as you know, in 1945 at San Francisco. His 
other great, I think, contributions were the Fulbright scholarships 
which I think have probably done more than any one thing to encourage 
understanding between people throughout the world. I could go on at 
great length about him. 
WN: Was it this association with Fulbright that got you sort of interested 
in the Democratic party? 
RH: Yes. I had known, of course ..•• Yeah, it was. It was really 
him. And, of course, I became interested in the problems that I 
felt were facing Hawai'i after the war. I felt that perhaps the best 
way to address some of those problems was to do it through the 
Democratic party. 
WN: What were some of the problems? 
RH: Well, we had a lot of problems. Like any place, when you're out by 
yourself, you tend to become parochial. I mean, areas become 
parochial in their outlook. So it's very difficult for people who 
were set in their ways to ch&nge their ways. And I felt that perhaps 
the Democratic party was the 'vehicle by which this could be done. 
As a matter of fact, while I had nothing to do with it or very little 
to do with it, the Democratic party did turn out to be the vehicle 
that brought about great change in Hawai'i, which I think, in general, 
for the good. That, of course, is debatable, but, I think, by 
and large, it helped what we have here a great deal. 
First thing, I felt one of the problems that has always concerned 
me is this concept of lease land. I mean, having a home on lease 
land. I just felt it was really an unAmerican concept. This was 
not to be critical of what had been happening, but it just riled me 
that a person couldn't buy the underlying fee. I was fortunate 
enough just before the war started, World War II started, to have 
bought a residence on the be~ch ~t Kahala. It was on lease land. 
And though the Bishop Estate terms were very reasonable, it just 
griped me that I couldn't buy that land, because this was my home, 
bought and paid for. And it always stuck in my craw that something 
should be done about that. 
(Taping interrupted, then resumes.) 
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RH: One of the matters about which I had concern was this leased 
residential land system. While it was not evil in the sense that it 
was wrong and evilly wrong, still I felt it was really an unAmerican 
concept. Not so much the 1 easing o.f the land as the denial of an 
opportunity to purchase the land. I found from researching into 
the matter in the late '40s, I ascertained that 92 percent of all 
the 1 and in the territory of Hawai • i was owned by the federal 
government, state [territorial] government, t 'he county governments 
and the 100 largest landowners. That meant that less than 8 percent 
was available in fee, really. And that was not a very good thing 
for a state to have a situation like that. I want to make this 
certain and clear: that I wasn't of the belief that the Bishop Estate 
or any of the large estates should give away the land, but at least 
give people the opportunity to purchase that land in fee at proper 
prices. And I can remember when I first came out for that, why, 
some people suggested that was a communistic idea. Well, actually, 
it wasn • t. 
There was a number of things that caused me to write an article 
that I wrote in 1949 which attracted a certain amount of attention. 
In fact, it was a full page editorial in the Star-Bulletin. That 
grew out of a situation •.•• Well, it came about like this: the 
editor of the Advertiser was Lorrin Thurston at that point in time. 
And we were having a longshore strike. And the strike was raising 
the devil with the economy here. In fact, some corporations, a lot 
of small businessmen just went broke . Even the large corporations, 
the sugar factors were having their difficulty. And it was really 
a serious situation. And Lorrin Thurston was railing about this. 
They were claiming this was a Communist concept and so on. I'm not 
saying he did necessarily but--well, he did. What was the bar 
association going to do about it? Well, of course, it wasn't 
anything for the bar association to do, but I sort of felt, well, 
there was something that ought to be said about that. And I wrote 
an article saying I wasn't speaking for the bar association, but 
one of the reasons why we were having the problem which gave rise 
to the situation they--Thurston and others--contended was happening, 
namely, that we were going Communist, was that actually we 
had a situation in Hawai'i which precluded people from becoming 
capitalists. And the thrust of my argument was that if a person has 
an opportunity to buy the land he sits on, when he buys that land, 
he becomes a capitalist because he has a stake in the land, a stake 
in the territory, a stake in the whole country. And that was the 
way in which you could bring people into the ambit of what they felt 
was a good system, the capitalistic system, which I think is a good 
system. 
Well, a lot of people felt, well, this is taking the land away from 
the estates and turning it over to somebody else. Well, actually, 
when I went into it, I found an interesting case, a federal case, 
Ninth Circuit. It's called Puerto Rico versus the Eastern Sugar 
Estates. What had happened was the Puerto Rican Territorial 
Legislature enacted legislation which enabled the territory of Puerto 
Rico--at that point in time it was a territory--to condemn the lands 
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of the Eastern Sugar Estates, and then subdivide the 1 and and sell 
out farm property to other individual owners. Precisely what they 
were doing under this present situation. And the Eastern Sugar 
Estates--a big Puerto Rican Eastern Sugar Company or Estates, whatever 
the name was--they took it up to the Puerto Rican Supreme Court and 
they got it ruled unconstitutional in that court. The case was 
taken up to the First Circuit Court of Appeals--! think it was 
Boston or New York, I've forgotten which. And there they upheld 
the act. By the way, the key to it was public purpose. And they 
said the question of what was a public purpose was a legislative 
question and not a judicial question. And if the legislature of 
Puerto Rico in its judgment felt that it would serve a public purpose 
in Puerto Rico to facilitate the purchase of land from one large 
landowner through the ~ondemnation process by the government and 
then turn around and subdivide it and see that other people got it, 
that was the end of it. That was public purpose. That was the 
determination by the legislature of Puerto Rico. Now, that case 
has never been overruled. And that's the very case to which reference 
is made in this Bishop Estate case this past year. 
CC: When you actually wrote this and then had it published as an editorial, 
what kind of ••• 
RH: I did n • t have it pub 1 i shed • • • 
CC: Well, when it was published ••• 
RH: No. What happened was that, strangely enough, the Advertiser didn't 
publish it. But Riley Allen, who was the editor of the Star-Bulletin, 
he picked it up and he thought it was worthy of publication. And he 
had a full-page article on the thing. I was happy for that because 
I wanted to get that concept across. 
CC: But at that time, there must have been other people who shared that 
view. I mean, you probably weren't alone ••• 
RH: Well, there weren't too many. There were some other people who did. 
Governor [Ingram] Stainback felt that it was wrong--that the land 
system that we had was wrong--and he was for land reform as far as 
that's concerned. 
CC: He was also very much concerned about Communism, wasn't he? 
RH: He certainly was. I mean, he was 
(Taping interrupted, then resumes.) 
CC: Governor Stainback, you said, was concerned about land reform. And 
I said he was also concerned about Communism. 
RH: Very much so. He was very much so. He was violent. He didn't like 
the ILWU leadership at all. He felt that it was Communist inspired. 
I never agreed with him entirely on that. But it was his view, and 
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he was very much opposed to it. He was very strong against it. But 
by the same token he was very strong for Communism [1 and reform]. 
He was very much supportive of it. 
CC: Of land reform. 
RH: Oh, yes. I mean, land reform, yes. You know, he was an unusual 
man. His personality was not a very good one. And then, lot of 
people didn't like him, but he was a good governor who brought our 
bonded indebtedness way down to a very low point. And he ran a 
tight government fiscally. I know when you wanted to get even another 
deputy in the attorney-general's office, that you had to clear it 
with him personally. He was watching the money. A little idea of how 
he felt about fiscal matters in the territory is, one day, I happened 
to remark to him when I was driving him down the street to the 
Pacific Club, I guess it was. We were passing that Vineyard 
throughway. It was being constructed. I said, "Gee, these freeways 
are nice things." 
He said, "There's not a goddamn thing nice about them." (Chuckles) 
He said, "They're certainly not free. There's not a damn good thing 
about them." (Chuckles) Words to that effect. Well, that was the 
way he was. 
WN: How did you meet Governor Stainback? 
RH: Oh, you know, I've lived here all my life. And even before I went 
to law school, you knew generally who the people were in government. 
He was a U.S. attorney, I believe, at the time. Then he became a 
U.S. federal judge when we were a territory. And then, in 1942, he 
was named as the governor of the [territory] of Hawai'i. He succeeded 
[Joseph] Poindexter who had been the governor on December 7[, 1941]. 
Stainback always felt very strongly about martial law. He felt 
that it was a terrible imposition on the people of the [territory]. 
And I think its continuance most certainly was. And I know that 
during the war, within a year or so after, couple years after I was 
in the military, I became a general staff officer up at Fort Shafter. 
And I knew that we didn't need to maintain martial law for the 
period of time that it was continued. But the truth of the matter 
was that martial law was something that the powers at be, the local 
powers at be, wanted--the people in the so-called Big Five organization--
! feel, as a method of control. Now, the people will dispute this, 
but I happen to know better because I've heard one of them tell 
General Richardson he wanted to continue martial law. 
CC: Now, this sort of feeds into the sort of the subject matter we're 
all talking about, that this interview's about, because it was 
precisely martial law and some of those situations which many people 
reacted to when they returned from the war and felt we really needed 
to have Hawai'i's status as a territory changed to statehood. And 
that sort of gets us into a lot of involvement because, eventually, 
Governor Stainback appointed you to the Statehood Commission, is 
that right? 
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RH: Yes, he did. Well, to understand the statehood movement, and I 
can't speak with absolute authority on that point, but I know that 
after the famous Massie case [1931-32] •... In fact, I was in 
Louisiana at LSU during that Massie case and I was shocked at the 
publicity that was •••• I guess William Randolph Hearst was a 
friend of Mrs. [Grace] Fortescue, the mother of Mrs. [Thalia] 
Massie. And they were painting Honolulu and the [territory] of 
Hawai'i as a place where no decent woman could walk the streets. I 
mean, the publicity was bad. And I know that there was a bill in 
Congress. I think it was--now, I could be wrong on this--by a 
congressman from Mississippi whose name, I believe, was Rankin, to 
take the territorial status away from Hawai'i and put it under the 
Navy Department, similar to the situation in which Guam was for 
many years, even for several years after World War II had been 
completed. 
So, in a way, although the statehood movement had started earlier 
than that, it became very important from that point forward because 
that would have meant we would have had very little to say about 
the way we governed ourselves. And there were a lot of good people 
who supported statehood. And most certainly, we deserved it. I 
know our state situation, our schools, and everything else, put us 
in equality. In fact, I felt, better than some states. I'd had 
the good fortune of going through some of the states in the '30s 
when I was in college. And I know very well we were capable of 
running our own show and doing very well with it. But statehood 
really had its great impetus following that Massie case. Then 
right after the war, there was a big movement on to move for 
statehood. 
WN: Was Governor Stainback in favor of statehood? 
RH: Candidly, no, he was not. He was not. But he was the governor, and 
the legislature came out for statehood and I think he supported it, 
although he didn't like it. I don't think he felt it was a good 
thing for the [territory]. It was his own individual feeling. I 
didn't agree with him there at all. 
WN: Was it because of the Communist issue or was it something else also? 
RH: I think, in part, he felt that way. But I feel that his views were 
somewhat similar to those, I think, of one of our leading industrialists 
here who was opposed to statehood. I think there were those here 
who felt that it would be better to retain the territorial status 
because if things didn't go the way those wanted it to go here in 
Hawai'i, they always had recourse to change in Washington, particularly 
through the Department of Interior or through the direct access to 
the president. Now, that's my own view on the matter. 
CC: So, they might have felt that they had more personal influence 
through those mechanisms and they would lose that if ... 
RH: I'm certain of that. I know that. I know that. 
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CC: But you were appointed to the Statehood Commission. So, he was 
fulfilling his role as governor by appointing people to a statehood 
commission. 
RH: Well, he had first appointed me to the Board of Harbor Commissioners, 
which was a very interesting job. You didn't get paid for it. It 
was sort of 1 ike a member of a board of directors. It had to do 
with controlling the harbors throughout the [territory]. It was very 
interesting. We built Pier 2, that terminal, during that period 
of time and had a small boat program. It was very interesting and a 
worthwhile task. I enjoyed it. So, he'd come in contact--he knew 
who I was and he knew me from that board. So he put me on the 
Statehood Commission. And I went to Washington on that Statehood 
Commission, and that delegation that went up in November of 1950. 
And that was an interesting experience and, I might say, a very eye-
opening experience. If you want me to elaborate on that, I'd be 
g 1 ad to do i t. 
CC: Yeah, how was it an eye-opening experience? 
RH: Well, first of all, you must understand what the status of the 
statehood movement was in Congress at that point in time. Truman 
was for statehood. The House of Representatives had passed statehood. 
The appropriate committee in the Senate had passed it onto the floor. 
And in November of 1950, it was on the floor of the United States 
Senate. November, early December. In other words, everything was, 
you might say, greased so that the thing would go through. And 
that's when the Statehood Commission went to Washington. 
While enroute, this is towards the end of November, we were having 
a war in Korea and things went bad because the Chinese entered the 
war and came over the Yalu River, and they were pushing our troops 
back all the way down the Korean peninsula. It was really bad. 
And if there was ever a time that the United States could have 
needed world's opinion to support it or to have the world believe 
that the United States was not a colonial power, this they could do 
by bringing in Hawai'i as a state to show that they would take in an 
offshore area with an interesting multiple type of population. And 
that was the argument I used when I talked to a lot of the senators. 
I was fortunate in that I did know some people in Washington, and in 
particular, Fulbright. Fulbright was helpful, but Fulbright couldn't 
vote for statehood. The reasons, I '11 go into. I also knew 
[John] McClennan. And he wouldn't go for statehood. The reason for 
the turn down of statehood as I understand it--and I • m sure I'm 
right about it--was that there was something more important in the 
minds of the senators than Hawai'i's statehood. And that involved, 
at that point in time, the control of the United States Senate, and 
particularly by the Southerners. The Southerners had a habit, a 
history, of reelecting their people to the Congress, and the Senate 
included, so that in the seniority system that applied there, those 
senators moved to become the head of the committees and they controlled 
the committees. And control of a committee in the Senate is a very 
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important thing. Now, the concern was, at that point in time, that 
if two new states came--well, one or two, Hawai'i or Alaska could 
come in--that would add two or four more senators, depending. And 
that would water down their power. And more importantly, they were 
concerned that the senators that might come from Alaska and Hawai' i 
might be liberal senators who would vote against their rule limiting 
debate. It was a rule of cloture. This was their concern. They 
would lose control because they could not then debate to death a 
bill they didn't want to have. That was the way it was explained 
to me. 
Here, we were up there. Lot of people went up, this committee, and 
lot of people went to work and they buttonholed senators, talked to 
people that were concerned . And the way that thing was shunted 
right aside by the U.S. Senate was hard to believe. I remember 
sitting there outside the Senate chambers. Now, at that point in 
time, I remember it well because the Senate chambers, for some 
reason, was either being fixed up or whatever, I've forgotten which. 
But the Senate was using the old Supreme Court chambers which were 
in the Capitol, the central part of the Capitol building, right, you 
might say, almost under the dome, where the Supreme Court of the 
United States used to meet before the new building was built, I 
guess, in the '30s. And you couldn't get in and watch the floor 
debate or anything else or whatever happened. But we were getting 
it fed out to us, the people who were members of the statehood 
committee, who happened to be there. And the thing was just moved 
right out. It was sort of tabled. The exact procedure, I can't 
recall with certainty. But that was what it amounted to. It was 
just passed over. 
CC: So, you somewhat felt frustrated or disappointed, or did you just 
fee 1 that statehood wasn't going to . . 
RH: Yes. Well, I felt it was a frustrating experience because here, 
you've gone up there knowing the background. It passed the House of 
Representatives, the president was for it, it passed the appropriate 
committee in the Senate, and here on the floor of the Senate. And 
top of that, that world situation. And to have that happen, it was 
a very frustrating thing. And I remember McClennan put it to me 
very well, Senator McClennan of Arkansas. Went in to see him, and 
I said, "Why?" 
He said, "Well," he says, he called me "young man." (Laughs) He 
says, "Young man," he said, "you and I know that Hawai'i is well 
able to govern itself. I have a son-in-law," I think he said, "out 
at Schofield," at the time. He said, "I know that you have all the 
capabilities, this, that and the other things, to be a state." But 
he says, "Young man, I'm going to tell you something you don't know." 
And he said it this way: "You ain't a-gonna get statehood." (Laughs) 
And I said, "Why?" 
And he said, we 11, it came right down to cloture. You know, the 
99 
control of the Senate. You know that left me .... I'll never 
forget. I talked to Silverman, the Undersecretary of Interior who 
was there to help the members of the statehood committee, and he was 
very helpful. And I talked to him that day, as we were sitting 
outside the Senate chambers, about it. And he first broached to me 
the concept that was about to come for Puerto Rico, the commonwealth 
concept. And he talked about it at some length to me. And they 
did get that status, and it's a status which gave them a lot more 
self-government than did Hawai'i as a territory. He also mentioned 
that there wouldn't be any federal taxes under that concept. In 
other words, the Puerto Ricans don't have to pay federal taxes. So 
I talked to him about it. And I talked to him, too, about the 
probability of statehood · succeeding in latter years, and he felt it 
would be very difficult. 
Well, I left Washington, and I came home very discouraged about it. 
I remember, I think it was soon after I arrived, somebody from the 
press talked to me about it. I said perhaps we ought to consider 
the commonwealth status. Well, there were some people who felt I 
was a Benedict Arnold. I was just telling it like it was. I 
frankly felt, at that point in time, because of that control 
s i tua ti on in the Senate, we'd never get statehood. We 11, it turned 
out I was wrong, and we did get it in 1959. But I really believe 
that most of the people who were working for it from 1950 up to 
maybe a year before it was enacted, or maybe till Alaska came in 
through, I think, fluke circumstances, honestly felt that we weren't 
going to get it. I felt it was my duty to tell it like it was, and 
that's what it was at that point in time. And I don't believe that 
anybody could honestly say that there was a realistic probability 
in 1951, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7--maybe in 8, the thing began to change, I 
don't know. 
CC: Do you think that there were some members of that Statehood Commission 
who really weren't for statehood? Do you think the governor might 
have had some folks who .... I mean, I know that everybody publicly 
was for it, but do you think, privately, some people weren't that 
enthusiastic? 
RH: I can't say that with certainty. I know that the governor wasn't 
for it. I know that he wasn't for it. I think most of the people 
while on that committee worked hard for statehood. 
CC: But might have gotten frustrated as you did? 
RH: Oh, I don't think anybody .... I was really frustrated. Because I 
felt, why shouldn't we have it? We deserve it. We've earned it. 
We've earned it both by the efforts in the war--we'd earned it before 
the war. We were capable of running ourselves. And we demonstrated 
it during the war. And there was no reason why we shouldn't have it. 
It was a very frustrating experience. 
WN: Stainback, he's sort of credited with being the one ... 
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(Taping stops, then resumes.) 
END OF SIDE ONE 
SIDE TWO 
WN: Okay, you were a part of the Statehood Commission and you were 
appointed by Governor Stainback. And you were telling us the story 
about the commonwealth idea, and you brought that idea back to 
Hawai'i. To what extent did you talk with Governor Stainback about 
this idea? 
RH: Well, actually, I talked to him, I think, when I was in Washington. 
I tal ked to him about my conversations that I'd had with Undersecretary 
of the Interior Silverman. And then, after I got back here to 
Hawai • i, I tal ked to him a few times. I didn't go out and really 
espouse the thing. I mentioned I felt this was a concept that we 
should look into, we should not overlook. And I also argued that if 
we. • •• With the co11111onweal th concept which waul d give you more 
self-government, appointing your own judges, you know, as they did 
in Puerto Rico, then we'd have a further opportunity to demonstrate 
our qualifications for statehood. Although I didn't think it was 
necessary, yet there would be further evidence. Not that I felt 
that it would make any difference because of that underlying control 
of the Senate concept, but I tal ked to him. I never really. • • • I 
was asked to talk about it on a number of occasions. There were 
quite a number of commonwealth advocates. Harold Rice over on Maui 
was one. There were others. There were lot of people who didn•t 
want to surface on the thing, including at least one of the Big Five 
presidents. He used to call me in and tell me to "go at it, go at it. 
go at it." 
I used to say, "Well, why don't you do it?" 
"Well, we can't do it, you know." 
It sort of was a frustrating thing in and of itself. But I wasn't 
really out •••• I mean, I said my peace on the thing and that was 
it. Now, there was a group of people who started a so-called 
Commonwealth party. I had nothing to do with them at all. Nothing 
to do with them. 
CC: Who did that? Do you remember? 
WN: Was it [Edward A.] Brennan who ran [for delegate to Congress in 1958 
on a commonwealth platform] ? 
RH: I don't know. I can't recall who it was. 
CC: Yeah, Brennan was one name. 
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RH: I can't remember who it was. But I felt that was a mistake, you 
know. You split parties. It's bad enough having two. You'd have a 
bunch of fractured parties 1 ike you have in France and Italy, and 
everybody runs • • • 
WN: Did you come across any kind of personal animosity or did anybody 
come up to you or communicate to you that they were very much against 
the idea of a commonwealth? 
RH: Well, there was some, you know. As I said, some felt I was a Benedict 
Arnold because I'd mentioned it. The fact that I felt we should 
look into it didn't mean I was opposed to statehood, quite the 
contrary. But I just felt we weren~t going to make it. Well, I was 
wrong, but I still feel that when we did obtain it, we did it because 
of a set of circumstances that existed in 1958 that did not exist 
back in 1950, or for that matter for the many years up to about 
1958. 
WN: Go ahead • 
CC: Okay, I was going to say, when you talked to McClennan and Fulbright 
and • • . 
RH: Others. 
CC: ••• and others, did any of the, well, shall we say, the influence 
of IMUA, or the groups that were talking about Communism here, were 
they felt in the Senate? 
RH: Let's put it this way, I don't think the IMUA group as such really 
swung a lot of weight, but they used •••• The concepts they were 
espousing, the claim that we were communistic or were moving in 
that direction, was picked up by some of the senators as a basis why 
we shouldn't get statehood. But that wasn't the real reason. The 
real reason was control of the United States Senate. All of the 
rest of it was window dressing, that's what it was. Now, there may 
be those who will disagree with me, but I don't think they could 
honestly disagree with me there. 
CC: It became a peg to hang your hat on. 
RH: Yeah. In other words, "Oh, why should they? 
Communists out there." That sort of thing. 
was it at all. 
They're a bunch of 
But I don • t think that 
WN: Governor Stainback in a lot of history books is sort of aligned with 
people like Walter Dillingham because he was opposing statehood and 
Walter Dillingham was opposing statehood. Was there any kind of a 
close relationship between the two? 
CC: You know, I don't really think so. I don't think so. They were two 
different types of men, both strong in their own ways. But I don't 
think they were. I'm sure they may have talked to each other, but 
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Walter Dillingham was sort of an aristocrat on one hand. And he 
was. You know, if we had that type of a person, he was one. Stainback 
was, in his own way, that way, but in a different sense. Their 
personalities were different, so I don't think they really closed 
ranks. I could be wrong. That's surmise on my part. 
WN: So, you were in favor of a commonwealth as a step toward the eventual 
goal of statehood? 
RH: Well, put it this way .••• I felt we weren't going to ever get 
statehood. That's the first thing. Because of what I've just told 
you. And I felt that if we weren't going to get it, we better take 
something that was better than the territorial status, what we had, 
and that was behind it. But statehood, we deserved. I mean, as a 
matter of--not a matter of right, but •••• Well, really as a matter 
of right. We had proved ourselves. We should have had it. 
CC: Some of the other folks who were operating in that era ••.• 
Actually, there's a little irony that it was under a Republican 
administration that statehood happened, not under the other, and 
it was just at the time when Hawai'i was changing from a Republican 
state to a Democratic party state. What was it like during those 
years? Who were some of the people that you remember as being very 
active in the party and things like •••• You remember Jack 
Burns, for instance? 
RH: I knew Jack Burns, yes. Jack Burns worked from behind the scenes 
initially. Well, he ran for the delegate to Congress in 1954 or 
'56, or both. Jack Burns, you got to hand it to him, he built the 
Democratic party. There was also Tom Gill who was an influence 
himself. A very upright man who had his own ideas, and those ideas 
clashed with Burns's. It was a shame that both of them never really 
got together so to speak. And then, there was the other group, 
Stainback. Stainback liked to have his people who were really for 
the old guard, for the territorial status, 1 ike Harold Rice, and 
some others, quite a number of others. That was a very small group. 
Eventually, I think, the Burns group brought about the replacement 
of Stainback as governor. Now, that again, is surmise, but I know 
that in 1951 Oren Long was made the governor of the territory. 
Stainback, however, being the influential man he was, was placed on 
the [territorial] supreme court. 
Incidentally, what really sort of brought home to me how unimportant 
we were in the eyes of the hierarchy in Washington was that •••• I 
remember going to the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington. 
They were saying, "Maybe we should put Stainback on the Bishop 
Estate." Well, what the devil was the Democratic party .••• But 
it showed you that they felt that this is what they could do and 
that sort of thing. We always used to think, why, we were right in 
the foremost eye of everything in Washington. Actually, the governor 
of the territory was only a subofficer of the Department of Interior 
and wasn't that important. Unfortunately, there were periods when 
our courts weren't fully manned. Our supreme court wasn't manned 
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because they just weren't going to get around to appointing somebody. 
So we weren't that important, but we always thought we were. The 
other thing we found out when I was in Washington in 1950 was Hawai'i 
had a reputation of being a poison pen jurisdiction. When anybody 
was nominated for anything, 1 etters used to flow into the Department 
of Interior saying what a lousy SOB this guy was or that guy, whatever. 
And I guess that it had that reputation, anyway. At least, that's 
what I was told. 
CC: They always got a reaction. 
RH: Oh, yeah. 
WN: You know, you were tal king about the old guard--you were part of an 
old guard that was sort of a minority within a Republican state, 
and then you have the young turks of Burns's group taking over. 
How did you feel about that, being a long-time Democrat in Hawai'i 
and seeing this changeover in the social structure of Hawai'i? 
RH: Well, I wasn't really aligned with anybody. I guess I've always 
been sort of an independent type of a person. I supported some 
things that one group stood for, and some that another. I wasn't 
really aligned with any particular group--the Burns group, the Gill 
group, or for that matter, the Stainback group. I admired Stainback. 
He was a brilliant man. I admired him for his brilliance and those 
things which he accomplished. He had some bad personality traits, 
but that had nothing to do with his abi1 ity being a governor and 
performing as a governor. And as a justice, he was a brilliant 
supreme court justice. And had he not been around in the early 
'50s, we would have had an absolute drought in our supreme court in 
terms of productivity, intelligence, and that sort of thing. And 
al 1 one has to do is to read the reports of the supreme court 
beginning at about • 38 of Hawa i • i, into the early '40s of Hawa i • i. 
You can see that. 
CC: You know, in a way, I think it's interesting. One of the people who 
ended up, I think, in part becoming governor because of his stand on 
or at least his stated position on land reform, was Bill Quinn. And 
I just wonder what your attitude was about Quinn since obviously you 
shared some views that were similar about 1 and reform and things 
like that. 
RH: Well, Bill Quinn is a very bright guy. He was then, he still is. 
Funny, we had parallel careers in a sense. He was appointed to the 
Board of Harbor Commissioners. He was appointed to the Statehood 
Commission. His big move came along at a time when apparently some 
people wanted to have a change in the governorship of Hawai • i. He 
had gone back [to Washington] and he had appeared [as a member of] 
the Statehood [Commission]. That was it. He went back when [Fred] 
Seaton was the secretary of the interior. That was it. This is 
back in • 56 or • 57, somewhere a 1 ong there. And they were 1 ook i ng 
for somebody. And Bill Quinn apparently caught the eye of Seaton 
as a bright young guy coming up. And he was. And they appointed 
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him as governor. He became the last appointed governor of the 
[terri tory]. 
In between there were some important periods. The Democratic party 
swept the territorial elections in 1954, whereas for fifty-four 
years approximately before then the Republican party had controlled 
the legislative houses of the [territory]. All of a sudden, the 
Democrats controlled the houses of the [territory]. And of course, 
that has eventuated to the point today where there is almost complete 
control. The one change was that Bill Quinn, who was the last 
territorial governor, ran for and became the first elected governor. 
That's because I think he was a popular governor, at first certainly. 
And he did a good job, I might add, in being the first state governor 
because he had the job of setting the organization into shape which 
was a big job. Sort of like the mayor or the group that builds the 
sewers, which are very important. Nobody sees them. He set up the 
framework of governor or had a lot to do with it. And he did a 
good job. But a lot of people didn't really recognize it for the 
great work that it was. I think he did a good job. Then, of course, 
Burns became governor, and Burns, of course, had a long term. And 
then, we have Governor Ariyoshi. We've only had three elected governors 
in all this period of time. 
CC: Want to ask anything else, like .... What's in store? What do you 
see? If you have a crystal ball, where do we go from here? 
RH: (Laughs) I don't know. Hell, I'm getting along in years to have a 
crystal ball. But I think we have a great future here. I think 
that there's going to come a time when I think we'll be--there are 
people who will disagree with me--and I think eventually we'll be 
out of the sugar business here. But I think what we should do is 
orient towards making this a great place in the world to live. I 
see the day when there'll be a lot of heavy residence, not heavy as 
in Honolulu. Between Kamuela, for example, and down into Kona because 
that's where the sun is. That's where the good beaches are up there. 
Just look at Maui, the way that's grown. And I see that this is 
where our future 1 ies. Perhaps we don • t have a great amount of 
natura 1 resources in the sense that some of the other states do. We 
have a good population and that sort of thing. I think that's where 
we're going to eventuate. And I used to say that. I said one 
benefit of being a commonwealth would be to attract people who 
wanted to come over here and live on a relatively--! mean, a federal 
tax-free status. We'd bring in all that kind of money. I even 
suggested that perhaps with the advent of the jet plane, that maybe 
Standard Oil of California would want to move over here so that 
their executives could come (chuckles) into a tax-free status. I 
used that as an example. I doubt whether that would be the considera-
tion, well, I can't say. But I believe that this is where we're going 
to eventuate toward. We're going to have a nice place to live. We 
have a nice place, but it's going to be continued in that vein for 
people who want to follow the sun. Just as they've done to Florida, 
except I hope we do not become the lousy place that Florida has 
become. We're more selective. Maybe the 2,500 miles of water 
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between here and the Mainland is going to make that a real possibility. 
You can•t get into an old automobile and drive across here. So, 
that•s where I think we•re going. I don•t know. Maybe some high-
tech things. That•s a little bit beyond my understanding. 
WN: Mine, too. (Laughs) 
CC: Mine, too. Maybe that•s where we should end. 
WN: Okay. Thank you. 
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